28 lines
1.3 KiB
ReStructuredText
28 lines
1.3 KiB
ReStructuredText
Security Notes
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At the moment only one widget type (Gmail) requires
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authentication information in order to get to the data.
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In the future there could be more, and you should give some thought
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to the issue of protecting your data. The Gmail widget type by default
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stores login information in the ``~/.netrc`` file, and you are advised
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to make sure that file is only readable by the owner. Other than that
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we can not force all users to conform to one standard,
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one way of keeping it secure, like in some keyring.
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First let's clear why we simply don't encrypt the login information
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and store it in ciphertext. By exposing the algorithm anyone can
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reverse the encryption steps. Some claim even that's better than
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plaintext but it's just security through obscurity.
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Here are some ideas actually worth your time. Users that have KDE
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(or parts of it) installed could store their login information into
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the Kwallet service and request it via DBus from the widget type.
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It can be done with tools like ``dbus-send`` and ``qdbus``.
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The Gnome keyring should support the same, so those with parts of Gnome
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installed could use that keyring.
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Users of GnuPG (and its agent) could consider encrypting the netrc file
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with their GPG key. Through the GPG Passphrase Agent they could then
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decrypt the file transparently while their session is active.
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